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 1 Introduction 
Large-scale and comprehensive development of river basins is a child of colonialism. Massive 
irrigation development in India, Egypt and Sudan by the British, emulated by the French or the Dutch, 
heralded a new area of the colonial economy. Large swathes of arid lands were brought under 
cultivation for the production of industrial crops such as cotton, sugarcane or rice. After gaining 
independence, the national governments took over the colonial model in an attempt to deliver the 
promises of 'development' and foster economic growth in rural areas (Molle, 2006). The development 
of water regulation infrastructures and irrigated areas in the 1950-1980 period achieved many benefits, 
including increased incomes, yields and production, and a global food sufficiency that is reflected in 
the long term decline of grain prices (Molden et al., 2007). In the absence of opportunity costs for 
labour such rural development projects had large multiplier effects and their economic justification 
was quite strong. 
With time, because of the opposition to dams, declining benefit/costs ratios and – perhaps – the very 
successes achieved in terms of food production, such projects have lost their economic appeal and 
funding by leading development banks dramatically dropped in the late 1990s. In the last five years or 
so, however, a fresh rhetoric of justification for large-scale water projects was observed. The World 
Bank, for example, has tried to set up a “new business model” for dealing with high-risk/high-reward 
infrastructure and has issued several documents that made the case for renewed investments in 
agriculture (Briscoe, 2003; World Bank, 2005). A number of countries have implemented or floated 
proposals for massive transbasin diversion projects (e.g., China, India, Jordan, Brazil, etc). Whether 
they are justified by hydropower generation, flood control, urban supply or irrigation, dams and canals 
and many megaprojects still feature prominently in the agenda of many governments. 
In arid environments, irrigation is still often seen as a redemptive solution and politicians have long 
seized the promise of water and the pledge to 'green the desert' as an electoral trump card. This paper 
first recalls a number of historical and current cases of river basin development partly or largely 
underpinned by the 'desert bloom' syndrome. The following section recounts the chronology of river 
basin development in the Northeast Thailand, reviewing the different projects that have been planned, 
designed, dreamt of, and sometimes implemented during the last 60 years.1 The ensuing section 
focuses on the rationale and justifications, the ideological underpinning, and the political and strategic 
dimensions of these successive projects. We are concerned here with the governance of large-scale 
project planning and with the justifications brought up by the national and foreign proponents (or 
opponents) of these projects. We hold that ideology and politics are overarching drivers of water 
resource development and that the way dominant players are able to cast their agenda largely 
determines outcome. Yet, there is evidence that the political arena where development trajectories are 
shaped is also conditioned by both supranational evolutions and the irruption of players from the civil 
society at large. 
                                                     
1 A more detailed account of the history of water resources development is given elsewhere (Floch et al., 2007). 
2 The 'desert bloom' syndrome and megaprojects in irrigation development 
Planners and politicians in dry countries have frequently been captivated by the 'desert bloom' 
syndrome, whether this led them to embracing small-scale community irrigation or large-scale river 
engineering. In the 19th century, scattered success stories (US, Italy, Spain, India, Egypt, etc.) were 
widely commented upon across the world; California, in particular, became an icon of the 'desert 
bloom' (Ertsen, 2006). Given the well known antecedents of civilizations that have thrived in arid 
lands thanks to their mastery of irrigation, this "rediscovery" can perhaps be explained by the potential 
offered by irrigation to colonial powers in their conquest of arid lands and to north European migrants 
in their expansion into the American West. This rediscovery of the promise of irrigation also coincided 
with scientism and the glorification of man's conquest over Nature, his "effort at the subjugation of the 
wilderness" (Smythe, 1905). 
These sentiments, not unambiguously, were often mixed with biblical symbolism. In the American 
version, at the turn of the century, irrigation carried with it a sense of moral imperative. People like 
E.A. Smythe (1905) viewed irrigation as "nothing less than the progenitor of civilization in an 
otherwise inhospitable land—the key to making the desert bloom" (National Research Council, 1996). 
They underlined the similarities between the holy land and Utah or California, both in terms of climate 
and of the divine mission allegedly vested in its people: the glories of the Garden of Eden itself, 
according to the bible, were products of irrigation and making "the desert bloom as a rose" was seen as 
a biblical mission2, a theme that would later also become central in the formation of the state of Israel 
(Lipchin, 2003). 
Colonial and technological hubris and the lure of extraordinary profits would later clothe this mission 
with new and more mundane attires. Sir William Willcocks, for example, inspired by his early 
experience in India and his research on ancient Mesopotamia, championed "the new-found powers of 
professional engineering to transform the world, and of the importance of state support in giving 
engineering's power to control nature full play" (Gilmartin, 2003). Referring to the works undertaken 
in the Nile river basin, Winston Churchill emphatically announced that "These giant enterprises may 
in their turn prove but the preliminaries of even mightier schemes, until at last nearly every drop of 
water which drains into the whole valley of the Nile… shall be equally and amicably divided among 
the river people" (McCully, 2001). Likewise, the French thought "the El Dorado would be at reach 
once irrigation is developed" in the inner delta of the Niger basin (Schreyger, 1984), and that "Rome's 
granary" would flourish again in Morocco. Just like the French liked to see themselves as the 
successors to the Roman Empire, and would compare the Sebou or Oum er Rbia plains to the Nile, 
expecting to convert Morocco into ‘a little Egypt’3 (Swearingen, 1984; Ertsen, 2006), Spain’s ruler 
Franco would later pose as a modern Pharaoh when unleashing a wave of dam construction. In South 
Africa too, like in most dry places in the world, irrigation was to "turn deserts into gardens" (Turton et 
al., 2004). 
                                                     
2 "This is the miracle of irrigation in the Syrian desert. It is no more miraculous in that far-eastern country than in our own 
West. Nor is Damascus more beautiful than Denver, Salt Lake City, or than any one of a score of modern towns in 
California" (Smythe, 1905) 
3 While Utah and its Salt Lake was compared to the Jordan valley and its Dead Sea, photos of irrigated fields at the foot of 
the Atlas were likened to their Californian counterparts at the foot of the Sierra Nevada. 
Even where biblical sentiment cannot be mustered, irrigation has long been the linchpin promise of 
politicians to farmers subjected to the vagaries of rainfall; and the favored option of governments 
seeking to ensure national food security, alleviate poverty, control potential social unrest, and procure 
political gains (Sampath, 1992; Abu Zeid, 2001). The Northeast of Thailand, or Isaan, although not 
arid by any standard, is the driest and poorest region of Thailand. If rice cultivation, supplied by 
derivation of small streams, has been practiced in valley bottoms for centuries, the expansion of 
cultivation on higher lands has made irrigation a crucial instrument of control of climatic uncertainty. 
3 "Greening Isaan": A recurring syndrome 
Isaan or the northeast of Thailand makes up 85% of the Thai territory that drains to the Mekong River 
(Koontanakulvong, 2006). The main rivers systems in the Northeast are the Mun, the Chi (the main 
tributary of the Mun) and the Songkhram rivers. The largest sub-basin is by far the Chi-Mun basin that 
covers roughly 120,000 km² and empties into the Mekong River at Khong Chiam. Rainfall in the 
Northeast is seasonally distributed, with around 85% of the total annual precipitation concentrated in 
the months from May to October, making irrigation a necessity if year-round cultivation is 
contemplated. Soils are generally considered of poor quality for agricultural production and yields are 
much lower than the national averages. 
While in northeast Thailand agricultural land totals about 58 million rai (9.3 million ha), land under 
public irrigation is comparatively small at 5.6 million rai (0.9 million ha). Moreover, although 
northeast Thailand accounts for 45 percent of Thailand's agricultural land, it received only 18 percent 
of the state expenditures in irrigation (World Bank and NESDB, 2005). This is commonly attributed to 
the lack of attractive sites for dams and to environmental constraints, which are reflected in an average 
per hectare cost higher than in other regions (World Bank and NESDB, 2005). 
Northeast Thailand is often identified with underdevelopment and stands out as the poorest region of 
the country. As a result, the development of water resources in general, and of irrigation in particular, 
has always been a top priority of planners and politicians since World War II (see e.g. Sneddon, 1999; 
2002). With state agro-industrial policies encouraging the rapid expansion of commercial agriculture, 
and as population pressure and market demand grew, (Vityakon et al., 2004), forest cover gradually 
shrank from 60% in the post-war period to 11% nowadays. Although the percentage of the population 
living below the poverty line has fallen dramatically (from 57% in 1962 to 38.5% in 1976 and 12.7% 
in 1996), poverty remains higher in rural areas in general (16%) and the Northeast in particular (26%) 
(Fan et al., 2004). The region distinguishes itself by a higher degree of specialization in rice farming, a 
higher rate of subsistence farmers, a lower use of agrochemicals, indebtedness of two farmers out of 
five, and a low implantation of industrial units that produce only 4% of the national manufacturing 
added value (World Bank and NESDB, 2005). 
3.1 Early development and piecemeal projects 
Securing, expanding, intensifying, and irrigating agriculture in Isaan has been taken as a mission by 
most decision-makers during the last 60 years. This section briefly recounts the chronology of water 
resources planning and development in Isaan. 
Traditionally irrigation in the northeast was confined to the alluvial soils of the valley bottoms of the 
secondary rivers, where earthen weirs, locally referred to as thamnop, were used to divert streams to 
the paddy fields (Neawchampa, 1999). Fukui and Hoshikawa (2003) report that in 1920 as many as 
503 earthen bunds could be found in the province of Nakhon Ratchasima Province alone. They also 
argue that irrigation of paddy fields around the Chi-Mun Basin was the norm rather than the exception, 
with cultivated fields located in the alluvial plains and valley bottoms. Additional storage was limited 
to natural or small village ponds which catered for a variety of domestic water uses and provided water 
security for the dry season. 
State-sponsored irrigation started in northeast Thailand in 1939, when the Royal Irrigation Department 
experimented with pilot tank irrigation projects and river diversion weirs. C. Khambu, the charismatic 
head of the RID in the 1950s, was an early advocate of small-scale solutions and vigorously argued for 
small and medium-scale reservoirs as the best option for Isaan (Kambhu, 1956). Further to these early 
efforts, small-scale development intensified in 1951 with the "tank programme", initiated with US 
assistance (USBR, 1965). In 1956, 127 dams had been constructed to irrigate an area of 25,000 ha 
(Khambu, 1956; ECAFE, 1957) and in 1963 a total storage capacity of 250,000 m3 had been attained, 
with 40,000 ha of potentially irrigable land. At the same time, the total command area of irrigation 
systems in northeast Thailand increased to more than 900,000 rai (144,000 ha), with more than 
600,000 rai (102,000 ha) potentially served by river diversion schemes. 
3.2 The Hydraulic Mission: Large- and medium-scale developments 
With increasing pessimism about the possibility of diverting unregulated flows from the main rivers of 
northeast Thailand, and with the implementation of the Tank Program being a comparatively slow and 
tedious process, in the late 1950s and early 1960s the Royal Irrigation Department increasingly looked 
into possibilities of large-scale storage projects (Floch et al., 2007). Following the World Bank’s 
advice, Sarit's government set up the National Economic Development Board (NEDB) in 1960 to 
centralize and coordinate development planning in Thailand. 
In 1960, the Japanese Government proposed to the Mekong Committee to undertake the 
“Reconnaissance of [Mekong] Major Tributaries”. The study team identified 16 sites in the Lower 
Mekong Basin and found that in northeast Thailand a total of four projects – the Nam Pong, the Nam 
Gam, the Lam Dom Noi and the Chaiya Phum” projects – would be the most favourable for large-
scale water resources development (EPDC, 1960). In its first regional planning document for northeast 
Thailand (NEDB, 1961), the new Board proposed to submit two irrigation and five multi-purpose 
projects to lending agencies "after thorough feasibility studies”, and listed a total of 16 large-scale 
projects, which together would potentially store 9.2 Bm³ and serve an irrigable area of 278,720 ha. In 
1965, the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) conducted the first river basin development 
planning study for the Chi-Mun Basin with the principle objective of recommending a “program for 
the orderly economic development of the Chi-Mun Basin, and to establish an order of priority for 
undertaking feasibility grade surveys on the potential projects in the basin” (USBR, 1965). Though 
slightly differing, all of these planning documents pointed to the importance of large-scale irrigation 
and multi-purpose development, and identified the few topographically suitable sites that later would 
guide planners and decision-makers time and again in the following 50 years. 
The first implemented large-scale storage project in northeast Thailand was the Nam Pung 
hydropower project, which was finalized in 1965, followed by the Ubol Ratana dam in 1966, the Lam 
Pao Reservoir in 1968, the Lam Takhong Reservoir in 1969, the Lam Pra Plerng in 1970, the 
Sirindhorn Reservoir in 1971 and the Chulabhorn dam in 1972 (Figure 1). The most favourable sites 
for large-scale construction were developed within a timeframe of only 10 years, leaving only the 
Upper Chi, the Nam Yang and the Lam Dom Yai rivers unharnessed by large-scale infrastructure. At 
the same time, medium-scale water resources development was also increasingly pursued and totalled 
close to 400 Mm³ of storage by 1978. 
Figure 1: Major infrastructure in the Chi-Mun Basin and the 1965 USBR vision of full development 
 
3.3 Small is beautiful? 
In 1975 the government of Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj made funding available (through sub-district 
or tambon funds) for small scale water infrastructure, notably several thousand village ponds and 
weirs in Isaan (Bruns, 1991); a programme that was extended in 1976 by Prime Minister Seni Pramoj. 
In 1978, in the wake of a few years marked by political turmoil and farmers' protests, the government 
re-phrased its official water policy through the introduction of the two-pronged water policy (AIT, 
1978). The focus shifted to (i) the development of distribution systems from reservoirs and rivers and 
(ii) the development of small-scale resource projects in every village as a means of meeting basic 
domestic water needs and allowing for minimal supplementary irrigation and for minimal dry season 
irrigation of backyard gardens.4 The same year, the Thai government established an "Accelerated 
Water Resource Development Committee" and the Northeast was designated as a "priority area for 
accelerated regional development efforts" (AIT, 1978). The sub-district funds were transformed by 
military governments into the Rural Economy Rehabilitation Programme and, in 1980, the Job 
Creation Programme, both of which primarily included water resources development projects. 
Implementation was, more often than not, problematic, with reportedly up to 80 to 90% of the weirs 
constructed under this programme said to have faced technical problems and to have failed (Bruns, 
1991). 
                                                     
4 The report estimated that only 20% of the population could benefit from large scale together with river-pumping schemes 
and that small projects could go a long way in serving the water needs of the remaining 80%. 
The 1978 study by the Bangkok-based Asian Institute of Technology (AIT) assessed potential 
irrigation targets (large scale, small scale, and pumping stations along main rivers, including the 
Mekong) and proposed to establish a semi-autonomous Mun-Chi River Basin Authority reminiscent of 
the Tennessee Valley Authority model. Based on this assessment, AIT found that a maximum of 7.2 
million rai (115,200 ha) were potentially irrigable in northeast Thailand, i.e. roughly 12% of the arable 
land suitable for agricultural production. The survey predicted problems of shortages during the dry 
season and the experience with small scale projects was deemed "discouraging". The Royal Irrigation 
Department’s own efforts to continue the development of the remaining sites that had been identified 
earlier as suitable for large-scale water resources development, were now considered inappropriate by 
the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), which made it considerably harder 
to implement them. The Lam Dom Yai and Upper Chi projects had been repeatedly studied but both 
were eventually dropped by decision-makers because resettlement difficulties were considered 
insurmountable. And it was only the relatively smaller Lam Nang Rong Project (1991), the Upper 
Mun Reservoir (1996) and the Lam Chae Dam (1998) that RID could implement during this period of 
time, none of which matched the earlier projects in scale. 
At the same time, and because of the difficulties experienced, RID was increasingly developing small- 
and medium-scale irrigation projects. RID implemented projects on basically all tributaries and 
watersheds in Isaan, with over 4000 small scale irrigation projects, storing over 800 Mm³ (Boonlue, 
2005), built between 1978 and present days. On top of that, the Water Resources Department of the 
Office of Accelerated Rural Development implemented 600 projects small scale projects and several 
additional programs made funds available for the construction or adaptation of small-scale water 
projects, including the Thai-New Zealand Project (Hafner, 1987), in the early 1980s, and the German-
funded Small Irrigation Projects (SIP) (which repaired part of the "Kukrit weirs", that had been put in 
place under the Job Creation Programme). 
However, in parallel with the Royal Irrigation Department’s construction efforts in northeast Thailand, 
a new and increasingly powerful actor – the National Energy Authority (NEA) – was emerging. In the 
late 1970s, the NEA started to implement electric pumping stations along the main rivers of the 
country, each station typically serving an area of 500 ha located within one kilometre of the stream. 
NEA had constructed the first hydropower project in northeast Thailand, the Nam Pung, and was now 
looking for means of promoting the utilization of the energy generated.5 It is estimated that some 
1,000 pumping stations have been implemented in northeast Thailand between the late 1970s and the 
present day (Boonlue, 2005). 
Considered together, all these investments make northeast Thailand a region with a diversified and 
dense irrigation infrastructure that considerably reshaped the land- and waterscape of the region. 
                                                     
5 See e.g. analysis of the Nam Pung Project in NEDECO, 1988. 
3.4 Water imports and regional water resources developments 
It had been recognized early into the reconnaissance surveys of northeast Thailand that internal water 
resources were ill-suited for the development scenarios envisioned by planners and decision-makers.6 
A low runoff to rainfall ratio and a mostly flat and undulating topography (which puts considerable 
limits on surface water storage and gravity diversions) made planners look into ways to import water 
from the Mekong River from the onset. In the Mekong dam cascade – a series of dams planned to be 
built on the mainstream Mekong River considered in early plans – import into, and distribution 
throughout, the region hinged on the Pa Mong dam, which would bring the twin benefits of storing 
water and raising its water level. However, implementation of the Pa Mong began to appear 
increasingly distant and Thai authorities and planning partners explored other options to augment 
water supply in northeast Thailand, in the continued effort to “green Isaan”. 
3.4.1 The "Green Isaan" project 
The first regional study that looked into ways to make northeast Thailand bloom was aptly called 
“Isaan Khiew” or “Green Isaan”. The fifth national economic and social development plan (1981-86) 
had (for the first time and on the ground of ‘national security’) included greater social and economic 
equity as an objective: a poverty-alleviation programme identified the 12,652 poorest villages (60 
percent of which were located in Isaan) and showered them with water supply, roads, schools, 
irrigation, electrification, and soil improvement (Baker and Pasuk, 2005). In 1987, Thai Army 
Commander in Chief General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh was aiming to become prime minister and in an 
attempt to build political support in Isaan, undertook to present His Majesty the King with a 
masterplan for the development of the Northeast.7 A severe drought had just hit northeast Thailand, 
and the project was presented as a response to it (Bruns, 1991). The report, prepared by British 
Biwater Company, was presented to General Chavalit in late 1987 and was geared towards the 
accelerated development of water resources, ensuring water supply, increasing reafforestation, and 
improving rural incomes (Biwater, 1987). Initial planning was largely done by army staff. The project 
met with "considerable criticism and skepticism" from politicians and academics (Bruns, 1991). 
With irrigation seen as an essential input for regional development, the study continued to detail 
strategies for water resources development. Numerous projects of all sizes were identified, and it was 
thought possible to store almost 5 Bm³ of additional water (basically the sum of all technical feasible 
storage sites at full development, regardless of costs), serving an additional 1.8 million rai (288,000 
ha). Additionally, Biwater looked into interbasin transfer options (some of them studied earlier) worth 
an additional 2.8 million rai (448,000 ha). Even though Chavalit tried to negotiate a loan agreement 
with the World Bank, the proposed project did not materialize. 
                                                     
6 The 1965 USBR report for example, states that "Full irrigation of all potential lands may not be possible due to the physical 
limitations on the amount of water that can be regulated by storage within the basin. Importation of water from outside the 
basin appears to be the only means of developing water for the full irrigation potential. Planning to develop water supplies 
outside the Mun-Chi basin for use within the basin was beyond the time and scope of this investigation, except to note that 
there are physical means of bringing water to the basin from other sources, notably the Mekong River". 
7 According to Pasuk and Baker (1997), Chavalit was able to divert 80 million baht from the government budget to the 
preparation of the Green Isaan scheme. 
3.4.2 The Khong-Chi-Mun project 
After the failure to implement the “Green Isaan” plans, a new grand project was elaborated by the 
National Energy Administration under the banner of the Khong-Chi-Mun Project (KCM). The project 
largely drew from earlier planning documents which had accumulated over the years and integrated 
them into one large planning framework. The to-be-infamous Rasi Salai dam, for example, had already 
been studied in 1982 by Dutch consultant NEDECO (1982) who had earlier assisted the Mekong 
Secretariat in studying pump irrigation in Isaan and the use of floodplains for storage8, which became 
a trademark of the KCM project (Gibb et al., 1988). 
In 1989, the proposed Khong-Chi-Mun project received a boost from the government of then-Prime 
Minister General Chatichai Choonhavan (1988-91), whose declared intention “to turn the battlefields 
[of Indochina] into market places” soon became the semi-official policy for development plans in 
northeastern Thailand (Pednekar, 1997; Kamkongsak and Law, 2001). The Council of Ministers 
passed a resolution approving the construction of the project and asked the NEA (which later became 
the Department for Energy Development and Promotion: DEDP), to complete feasibility studies by 
1992. Initially proposed with the objective to systematically meet water supply and consumption needs 
and to make water shortage in northeast Thailand a thing of the past, the 1992 feasibility study detailed 
that it was technically feasible to irrigate an area of 4.98 million rai (796,800 ha) in 15 provinces, with 
construction being envisioned in three successive stages over a period of 42 years (ASEAN et al. 
1992; see also Figure 2 for a general layout of the project at the proposed full development). 
Unlike the earlier Green Isaan project, however, the KCM project was (partly) implemented. Some 
weirs in the Chi and Mun floodplains were constructed and new and larger pumping stations 
complemented the already impressive number of small-scale electric pumping stations constructed in 
earlier years by the NEA. Construction of the Rasi Salai weir/dam on the lower Mun river was 
completed in 1994; the Huana Dam, the largest dam structure within the overall scheme and 
downstream of Rasi Salai, was constructed shortly after (construction took place from 1992 to 2000). 
Both projects triggered sustained protest from the local population whose livelihoods depended on the 
services so far provided by the floodplains, and drew heavy criticism from civil society and academics 
which pointed to the lack of research, transparency and participation (Sretthachau et al., 2000; Rasi 
Salai Declaration, 2003; Shannon, 2005). 
Despite the outcry, in 1997 then-Prime Minister General Chavalit gave full support to the KCM 
project as the only way to ensure sufficient water supply to the "long-suffering farmers of the 
Northeast" and waved the long-held promise of 'turning the northeast green' in front of an assembly of 
village and district chiefs gathered in a five-star hotel in the city of Khon Kaen (Sneddon, 2003). With 
the advent of the financial crisis in 1997, large-scale capital intensive projects were once again 
shelved. The KCM remained incomplete, with its cascade of weirs along the Chi and Mun lower 
reaches challenged on social and environmental grounds, few of the planned pumping stations 
effectively implemented, and with no additional water imported from the Mekong River. 
                                                     
8 In 1989, the Mekong Committee reported that it had introduced a new concept in the design of flood control and storage 
projects by constructing reservoirs in the areas affected by annual flooding (Mekong Secretariat, 1989). Beset by resettlement 
problems and constrained by the depletion of attractive dam sites in northeast Thailand, the intergovernmental body 
recommended that the Government of Thailand should adopt a strategy in a consolidated way so that each step would be 
taken with the firm knowledge that, in the event that each project is demonstrated to be economically and technically feasible, 
the Government would wish to pursue further implementation of such a scheme (Mekong Secretariat, 1989). 
Figure 2: The Khong-Chi-Mun Project: General layout and typical infrastructure9  
 
3.4.3 The Water Grid 
It was not until 2003 that the next avatar of the "greening" syndrome materialized, when the Thaksin 
government launched the idea of investing US$5 billion in a project supposed to do away with water 
problems in the country (see full details in Molle and Floch, 2008). In July 2003, a workshop on 
"Sustainable Water Resource Management" was organized by the National Water Resource 
Committee. Despite the alleged priority to water demand management proclaimed in the Ninth 
National Plan (2002–2006), it was announced that the irrigated land of 29.46 million rai would be 
incremented by an additional 103 million rai within five years, with the expected benefit of enabling 
farmers to cultivate and access water all year round. Although project targets announced in the 
newspapers proved to be fuzzy and contradictory they all pointed to a dramatic increase in irrigated 
land (Molle and Floch, 2007). The current achievement of 22 million rai was contrasted with a total of 
131 million rai of cultivable land nationwide. The public presentation indicated that “11 million rai 
would be fully irrigated, and that 25 million rai could be planted with crops that require much less 
water than rice. Another 73 million rai would be irrigated for household consumption and self-
sufficiency in agriculture” (Bangkok Post, 3 May 2004), while “a nationwide tap water system will be 
installed by 2005 so villagers and farmers throughout the country can enjoy running water all year-
                                                     
9 Left: layout of the Khong-Chi-Mun Project with potential irrigated areas at full development. Right-top: typical in-stream 
Khong-Chi-Mun Weir (here at Rasi Salai). Right-Bottom: Typical large-scale pumping station of the Khong-Chi-Mun 
Project (the picture shows the main pumping station at the Lam Dom Yai Project). 
round.”10 Borrowing from the power generation sector, the project was dubbed "Water Grid", to 
describe a set of interconnected reservoirs and basins allowing the movement of water from sources to 
water-deficient areas.11
The plan presented included several transbasin diversions, the Kok-Ing-Nan (2.08 Bm3), the Salween-
Ping (3.8 Bm3), diversions from Cambodia and three Lao rivers, and listed 18 alternative diversion 
plans all over the country. The northeastern region, however, was to be the major beneficiary of the 
development project. It provided maps of the major projects envisaged and mentioned two projects 
almost ready to be implemented (from 2005 onward): the Petchaburi/Prachuab Kirikhan interlinking, 
with water sourced from the Mae Klong basin, and the Nam Ngum-Chi-Mun project which would 
transfer over 4 Bm3 of water from the Mae Ngum dam in Laos through a siphon under the Mekong 
River, with pumping stations allowing transfer to the Chi basin. Figure 3 sketches out this project as 
well as other companion projects for the Northeast region. 
Figure 3: Water Grid in Northeast Thailand 
 
In early 2004, the project came under fire from several quarters, including academics doubting its 
economic profitability (Bangkok Post, 30 Mars 2004), environmentalist predicting salinity problems 
                                                     
10 A document subsequently posted on the website of the Department of Water Resources (DWR) modified several aspects of 
the proposal, considering a time frame of 23 years to implement an additional 60 million rai of irrigated land, and also 
reducing the overall potential from 131 to 111 million rai (DWR, 2004a). 
or recalling that earlier pilot projects had failed (Bangkok Post, 14 April 2004; 3 May 2004), as well as 
water experts such as Senator Pramote Maiklad, who opined that the "project is not cost-effective nor 
feasible in terms of engineering techniques" (Bangkok Post, 3 May 2004) and its timetable unrealistic 
(The Straits Times, 2003). In late 2005, the Government also planned to spend up to 1.7 trillion Baht 
(US$43 billion) over five years on megaprojects aimed at boosting activity and reducing poverty, 
including investments in the irrigation sector (MOAC, 2006). All these plans were largely 
discontinued by the 2006 coup that ended the then-Prime Minister Thaksin's administration. 
3.4.4 Transfers from Lao-PDR and other recent alternatives 
Although the grand projects of Thaksin era seemed to have faded into oblivion the idea of tapping 
water from Lao tributaries of the Mekong, siphoning it under the river and using it in Isaan, 
reappeared in 2007. This idea, also part of the Water Grid, was first tested in 1998 by Sanyu 
Consultants which envisaged building two dams on the Xe Banghiang River in Laos, close to the 
confluence with the Mekong, from which 3.3 Bm3 of water could also be abstracted and siphoned 
under the Mekong into Isaan (RiversWatch, 2002). Another plan studied by Sanyu in 2004 considered 
siphoning water off the Nam Ngum dam in Lao PDR to the Huay Luang stream. While this option is 
technically feasible the expected cost of 0.5 baht for a cubic meter of water raises serious doubts about 
the economic relevance of the project. A study financed by the World Bank and the French Agence 
Française de Développement (AFD) was carried out to examine the possibility of diverting water from 
the Nam Ngum and Se Bangfai rivers but did not lend support to further investigation on that matter. 
In 2006, a trade journal announced that a newly-formed Thai agency, the Department of Alternative 
Energy Development and Efficiency,12 was reviewing plans at Pa Mong and Sambor [on the main 
stream of the Mekong], and that a private Thai engineering firm (Panya Consultants), would conduct a 
US$ 2.4 million study revisiting a total of seven sites first identified by bureau staff in 1952 (Biggs, 
2006). In summer 2007 the Chinese were contemplating funding the Sambor dam in Cambodia that 
was once again the object of a technical study. Likewise in Thailand the Ministry of Energy has 
recently commissioned two Thai consulting companies to conduct a feasibility study on the 
construction of the Ban Koum dam on the Mekong River, in the province of Ubon Ratchathani, that 
would power a 1,800-megawatt generator for an estimated investment of Bt90 billion (approximately 
US$3 billion) (The Nation, 2007).13 It is not known whether the dam is also planned for irrigation of 
parts of Isaan. 
Last, in February 2008, the newly-appointed elected prime minister, within a week of his investiture, 
announced that two megaprojects would receive priority, including a plan to divert water from the 
Mekong River "through underground tunnels to Loei and Udon Thani, where reservoirs will act as 
distribution centres to send the water on to farms in other provinces during the dry season. The water 
will be transported through small pipelines" (Charoenpo, 2008). The desert bloom syndrome is alive 
and well. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
11 Of course, because of its bulky nature, moving water is a much more expensive venture than moving electricity. Some 
examples of such pressurized grids, or “carriers,” exist in small arid countries, such as Israel, Cyprus, or Tunisia, but their 
costs have generally prevented expanding the concept at a very large scale. 
12 This department originated from the earlier DEDP and is now under the Ministry of Energy. 
13 Several other on-going dam surveys in Laos and Cambodia have also recently been uncovered and have led to heavy 
criticism of the Mekong River Commission by civil society groups. 
4 Aspects and cross-cutting themes 
The storyline of the development of water resources in the Chi-Mun river basins presents a number of 
recurring themes which are analyzed in this section. They include the justifications given and the 
politics of water resource development, the engineering ethos and lopsided governance patterns. 
4.1 Metadiscourses and the rhetoric of justification 
Stigmatizing Isaan as poor and dry, Thailand’s development agencies saw water resources 
development as the key solution to the problems of the region as early as the 1950s (Sneddon, 2002). 
Development was the post-war magic wand that would partly come from joint regional development 
of the Mekong river basin (see Molle and Floch, 2008). Investment in dams, pumps, tubewells, but 
also roads, electrification, or eucalyptus plantations, would bring prosperity. In the Green Isaan 
project, for example, the establishment of agro-industry was the focal point of development and would 
"produce the processed goods for regional export, create employment opportunity in the urban areas 
and create the demand for agricultural products… Irrigation, required to produce raw materials for the 
agro-processing industry, will create wealth and job opportunities in the rural areas" (Biwater, 1988a). 
The standard description of Isaan is to ascribe its lack of development to natural causes: unpredictable 
climate, "dryness", poor soils, lack of storage, population pressure, or "traditional", if not backward, 
farming practices: all putative reasons why "the Northeast has historically lagged behind other 
regions" (World Bank, 1975). These perceived lacks inevitably lead to calls for increased water 
storage and irrigation infrastructure, secondarily roads and better links to markets, and sometimes 
improved social services. Irrigation is generally justified by positive (desert bloom) or negative 
(cracked soils during water shortages) images and by the mere observation that farmers in irrigated 
areas are better off than in rain-fed areas. This hardly comes as a surprise, as one would expect that 
investing, say, $10,000 per hectare, does yield some benefit; but benefits are routinely emphasized 
without reference being made to the costs first incurred. Then-Prime Minister Thaksin, for example, 
reportedly said that “it would not be a problem if the [Water Grid] project required a lot of money 
because it would be worthwhile eventually”; likewise the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the 
project, saw the project as “a worthwhile investment because it will benefit 30 to 40 million people 
nationwide” (The Nation 23 June 2003).14 Prime Minister Samak's recent proposal is also "an 
ambitious water project aimed at helping farmers in the Northeast, the country's poorest region" 
(Charoenpo, 2008). That "every farmer, especially those from the 19 provinces in the Northeast, 
should have access to water" (The Nation, 24 September 2004) seemed to be taken as an 
uncontroversial and desirable future, with no relation whatsoever to costs or alternative options.15 In 
late 2007, Suwit Khunkitti, the once Minister for Natural Resources and the Environment and top 
proponent of the Water Grid, vowed to "continue any policies proven to be good and introduce new 
                                                     
14 The project would also be justified because farmers in irrigated areas earn three times more than those forced to find their 
own water supplies, said Mr. Thaksin, and because "if the irrigation system was extended, both farmers and the government 
would reap higher revenues" (The Straits Times, 26 July 2003). 
15 In contrast with demand management strategies that are emphasized in the 7th Plan, this conception seems to be quite 
widespread within water agencies: see also the comments by a high-level official: “Water distribution doesn’t completely 
cover those irrigation areas; we’ve lost a balance between storage and distribution” (Bangkok Post 28 December 2003); or M. 
Rungrueng: “We urgently need to find water and we must do it whatever way we can. It is as if we are about to drown; we 
have to grasp anything, even a floating dead dog” (The Nation 24 April 1994). 
ones, such as the water tunnel system for the Northeast. A study has shown that poverty persists in 
only 10 per cent of irrigated areas while 80 per cent of non-irrigated zones remain poor." 
Another classical means of furthering projects is to propose them under the umbrella of politically-
charged and overriding meta-justifications (Molle, 2008). Such meta-justifications typically include 
national goals or priorities such as food self-sufficiency, national security, "modernization", or the 
fight against poverty. Justifications for developing the Water Grid in general and irrigation in 
particular were based on arguments that merely emphasized expected benefits and were shrouded in a 
pro-poor rhetoric that magnified the assumed power of the state and attendant benefits. Thaksin 
"vowed to eradicate all water-related problems plaguing the country, which he said were major hurdles 
in the government's war on poverty," and the study, to be completed within a year, would design 
"projects to control levels of water in 25 river basins, to help rehabilitate forest and soil resources," 
helping him meet his goal of eradicating poverty by 2009 (The Straits Times, 2003). The "war on 
poverty" was clearly branded as an overriding meta-justification that offered a means to silence 
opposition since, obviously, nobody is against poverty reduction (Molle, 2006b). 
A major meta-justification of water resource development in Isaan, well until the mid 1970s, was the 
threat of communism, whether represented by local insurgent groups or by neighbouring countries. 
This motivated massive injection of US aid into the region (see next section). The northeast region 
insurgency was used by both the US and the Thai military to justify their objectives (Bell, 1969). The 
scare of communism was used to justify foreign aid, military build-up and suppression of opposition to 
the regime (Darling, 1965). Such meta-justifications present projects as the result of "pressing needs" 
that bear no contestation. A Thai general, for example, was reported to say that it is "necessary for us 
to launch a campaign like the Green Northeast project. It is a matter of national security and the 
northeast is of much strategic importance" (Labournet, 2004).  
The politics of water resource development also often include manipulation of symbolic power. The 
July 2003 workshop on "Sustainable Water Resource Management" organized for the launching of the 
Water Grid was opened with a quote from His Majesty the King “The main point is the need of water 
for consumption, water for agriculture because water is life. People can’t live without water. People 
can live without electricity. If there is electricity but no water, people can’t live”. Symbolic support 
from the King is frequently marshalled by recalling his fondness for irrigation and rural development 
and his support of dams for flood protection.16 The Green Isaan project was thus aptly billed "Nam 
Pratan Nai Luang", that is, Water from the King, while opposition to projects like the Pasak dam were 
efficiently silenced by stressing the King's patronage of the dam. 
An interview of Roongrueng Chulasata (Watershed, 1999), a former DG of the Royal Irrigation 
Department, provides a textbook illustration of the range of discursive devices that are mobilized to 
justify more infrastructure: 
 
At present, the quantity of water is not sufficient because of an increase in the population which has led to 
more demand for water… And because many forests have been destroyed, water cannot be retained. So it 
became necessary that we build a big reservoir to retain water for the dry season… The increased 
population has led to more agriculture and more demand for water. It would be good if people were not 
born. But since the population has increased, everything has been affected. 
 
                                                     
16 See http://www.rid.go.th/eng/Irrigation%20Project.html for water-related projects initiated by His Majesty the King. 
However, water is a necessity. When there is a water shortage, it is the RID who is responsible for it. We 
have tried to propose every solution to solve the problems… Nowadays, in the IMF time, the population 
in Bangkok has decreased because some people have gone back to agriculture. But they would not have 
water if the RID did not provide them with water sources. How could we survive? Luckily, the RID has 
prepared for this. 
 
I think we are “lost”. Many people have imitated foreigners. They want to preserve resources without 
them being fully developed. It is necessary to develop everything to its full capacity before preserving it. 
If we preserved our natural resources, what could we use? Would you want to buy them from 
elsewhere?... Many people ask why we want to do it [interbasin diversion project]. It is because it is a 
duty we have been assigned. We have learned to find water for you not for ourselves. You live well right 
now because of what we have done in the past. 
The statement borrows from faulty hydrological knowledge, glosses over the fact that urban needs 
hardly total 10% of water diversions, does not discuss how farmers' "needs" are themselves related to 
irrigation overdevelopment, stresses the ills of population and urban growth that leave no choice to 
dutiful and engineers, contrasts their disinterested mission with the irresponsibility of dissenters and 
with the foolishness of foreigners. Unsurprisingly, the interview achieved a closure of the debate 
through a familiar Thatcherian TINA (There is No Other Alternative). 
Whether out of good intention or as channels of official statements, the media also often contributes to 
turning unavoidability into common wisdom. Recently, for example, the Bangkok Post (200717) 
discussed the hypothesis that at some time in the future Thailand would not be able to feed its own 
people and would depend on food imports, having "to fork over a hard-earned foreign exchange 
advantage to buy ever more expensive food, … [with] little money left for development", pointing to 
the imperative to "never abandon its determination to maintain food security". Alarmist discourses are 
also commonplace, as illustrated by a high official justifying the Phetchaburi project because the 
province ran the risk of "becoming a 'desert' because the province received less rainfall than the 
amount of water evaporating from its soil" (Bangkok Post, 14 April 2004). Clichés of the region as 
"the water-starved Northeast" (Bangkok Post, 2008) implicitly legitimize supply augmentation 
projects. 
The stigma of drought and flood and the "naturalization" of poverty in Isaan make it possible to insist 
in developing water resources. At the same time this diverts attention from other structural aspects of 
regional development and from the predominance in Isaan of ethic minorities who had largely been 
ignored during the boom years of the Thai economy (Freisen, 1999: 221). Extension of upland and 
fibre crops in the 1960s, or of eucalyptus in the 1980s, has benefited large urban-based entrepreneurs. 
The region’s agricultural surpluses have been tapped for export, the benefits of which are appropriated 
by the metropolis, with only marginal changes in technology or living standards in the producing areas  
(Bell, 1969). This urban bias has been epitomized and affected by the rice premium, which siphoned 
30% of the added value of rice production to the state and urban development. Because of its limited 
irrigated area the Northeast was, on top of that, discriminated against, if compared with more 
productive irrigated areas. 
4.2 Geopolitics and politics 
Post-war Mekong geopolitics has been a central determinant of government interventions in Isaan 
until the mid 1970s. The political situation dictated that Thailand would be the only country to be able 
                                                     
17 The article is itself a commentary of an editorial of Nongnuch Singhadecha in the Matichon. 
to benefit from US/western willingness to help develop water resources in the region; one which 
would fully embrace the objective of combating the spread of communism by investing in rural 
infrastructures. Indeed, a major objective of small scale investment programmes, as well as major 
efforts to open up "pink areas" by expanding road networks, was countering insurgency. 
Security considerations have been paramount in the composition of the US aid program in Thailand 
(which started with the communist takeover in China in 1949, and the spread of internal communist 
insurrection in Burma, Malaya and the Philippines).18 As Steinberg pointed out, US interventions “at 
their most naïve, (…) have been justified by the ‘domino theory’, [and] at a sophisticated level they 
have attempted to help the Thai authorities establish productive sovereignty over their periphery”. By 
the early 1960s, US policy with regards to long term assistance to Thailand was characterized by the 
AID (Agency for International Development) as serving Thailand to increase its capability to defend 
its independence against communist subversion and insurgency, assist Thai efforts to alleviate the 
economic and social conditions (especially in security sensitive areas), and to assist the Thai efforts 
toward long-range social, political, and economic development until an adequate rate of self-sustaining 
growth is achieved (AID, 1963; quoted in Steinberg 1986). By 1973, USAID director in Thailand – 
would characterize the program in Thailand as consisting of two types: (i) security with development 
aspects and (ii) development with security aspects (Hill, 1973). As, Steinberg (1986) noted, AID felt 
that over half of the program was primarily security oriented.19
One of the major security supported programs supported by AID was the Accelerated Rural 
Development Program (ARD), largely funded by the United States and the World Bank (World Bank, 
1975), which received over US$ 60 million for the construction of rural feeder roads, potable water 
systems and small-scale irrigation systems in security sensitive areas in northeast and northern 
Thailand. It was designed in such a way as to integrate remote and ethically diverse regions and to 
allow the central government to exert control over these areas (Steinberg, 1986). While able to 
implement rural infrastructure, the project found critics both within the Thai academia and from 
foreign observers. Jacobs (1971) described it as “an ambitious direct action, paternalistic, government-
service program, frankly aimed at winning friends for the existing political order”, and one that would 
deliver to the villagers what the central government thought they would need. But also, by bypassing 
the control of the Ministry of Highways (considered as rigid and ineffective), the formation of the 
ARD program, raised the question of “whether and under what conditions it may be wise for foreign 
aid organizations to assist in the establishment of new institutions whose functions specifically are 
designed to bypass existing ones, thereby, perhaps, further weakening line agencies”. 
Later on, the then active mission director of USOM would comment that, “it is a known fact, disputed 
only in degree because of the inadequacy of the information available, that during those twenty-three 
                                                     
18 US interventions in the region have been prompted by fears such as the invasion from the People’s Republic of China, 
regional security after the French defeat in Dien Bien Fu, deterioration of conditions in Laos, the inception and the active 
communist insurgency in Thailand, Thailand as a base for action in the Vietnamese War, the international trade in narcotics, 
and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia (Steinberg, 1986). 
19 Since the assistance program was justified to the US Congress as being focussed on security, it is likely that there was a 
certain amount of “security salesmanship” in project documentation, a phenomenon known to be widespread at any point 
when policies change and projects must be approved. It might also be that Thai officials interested in development used their 
own “security salesmanship” to get development projects approved under security auspices (Steinberg, 1986). But also, 
according to Steinberg “it should be noted that Thailand was by no means unique in such programs, which were widespread 
throughout the world. Asserting Thai sovereignty over border or insecure areas often seemed to have mixed results, with 
corruption or oppression by police or other central government officials undercutting the purpose of the programs”. 
years [of US assistance to Thailand] the poorest segment of the population has benefited least from all 
those expenditures" (Hill, 1973). 
Although concerned by these geopolitical considerations, Thai politicians also saw massive public 
investments as a means of procuring private political and financial gains. By associating themselves 
with a large water project and conjuring up images of water abundance in order to dispel 
precariousness and poverty, politicians expect to establish political support and constituencies. This 
explains the ever-returning grand development projects reviewed earlier. Non-credible announcements 
of grand targets reveal the political motivations of these projects. The Green Isaan project, for 
example, promised to make the northeast "green" within five years by improving water resources and 
raising the percentage of forest areas (Bruns, 1991), while the 1991 regional development plan for the 
lower northeast region foresaw industrial development in the region, with Korat destined to become 
the 'Detroit of Thailand'. Likewise, in 1997 General Chavalit reiterated the promise to “turn the 
northeast green”, while Thaksin's Water Grid was to triple Thailand's irrigated area in five years with 
“a nationwide tap water system… installed by 2005 so that villagers and farmers throughout the 
country can enjoy running water all year-round” (Bangkok Post 3 May 2004b). The Prime Minister 
also "vowed to eradicate all water-related problems plaguing the country, which he said were major 
hurdles in the government's war on poverty" (The Straits Times, 2003). 
Notwithstanding the influence of external factors and the political gains sought by politicians, the Thai 
administration also pursued its own version of the hydraulic mission enmeshed in local and national 
politics (Floch et al., 2007). As elsewhere, water resource development stood at the confluence of 
interest groups motivated by professional, financial or political gains (Molle, 2008). As explained by 
Bruns (1991): 
"Irrigation projects are large and visible rewards that politicians can offer in exchange for 
support. Members of Parliament are active in lobbying RID for projects, at the request of their 
constituencies. MPs and representatives in provincial assemblies may be contractor themselves 
or have links to them and stand to gain from building projects funded by the Job Creation 
program or the provincial Administration. At the national level there has been strong political 
pressure for construction of water resources projects." 
With Isaan remaining both the poorest region and the largest 'reservoir' of voters (40% of the 
population), it is no wonder that, as recalled sympathetically by the Bangkok Post (28 July 2003), 
"The idea of transforming the Northeast into a 'promised land' where poor farmers can grow rice and 
other crops and raise livestock to make enough money to sustain a traditional livelihood without 
having to travel to the city to make a living every dry season has never faded from the minds of some 
caring northeastern politicians". A vision shared and promoted by consulting and construction 
companies more than willing to contribute to greening Isaan. As summarized by Chaianan 
Samudavanija (1995), "in the name of ‘economic development’ the military and bureaucratic complex 
acquired additional financial sustenance through sponsoring infrastructure construction in rural areas. 
The corruption associated with these projects helped the various patron- client networks maintain their 
political authority over the rest of the country’s population". 
Financing, however, whether from state coffers or through bilateral/international funding, is not 
always forthcoming. Although Chavalit tried to negotiate a loan with the World Bank for his Green 
Isaan project (Hewison, 1994) and although the project was bundled into a major arm deal purchase 
with the British government (Bangkok Post, 1994; LabourNet, 2004), the project did not materialize. 
Thatcher's government was ready to grant US$100 million and provide a loan of US$500 million for 
the project if agreement was found on a major package of military equipment purchase. Although the 
Thai Government allocated money for the programme in the 1989 budget plan, the joint project 
foundered, partly because the Americans succeeded in reasserting themselves as the main arms 
supplier (LabourNet, 2002). Likewise, when the Mun River Basin Water Resource Development plan 
(Binnie and Partners 1995) was completed in 1995, with EU funding under the auspice of RID, the 
NESDB eventually denied funding to RID, although proposals for further development of water 
resources and irrigation had been dramatically downsized. Promotion of the KCM project was also 
allegedly embroiled in corruption linked to the military regime in the early 1990s (Samudavanija, 
1995). 
Within the administration, the prospect of massive projects and attendant funding also awoke 
professional and financial interest. The KCM project was developed by the NEA/DEDP, an agency 
under the Ministry of Science and Technology which succeeded in challenging RID's monopoly on 
water/irrigation infrastructure.20 The Water Grid also demonstrated the financial and political 
attractiveness of such projects for both line agencies and politicians. The project remained delayed as a 
“result of a row between Natural Resources Minister Suvit Khunkitti and Agriculture Minister Somsak 
Thepsuthin over who should oversee the project,” because “both ministers want[ed] to supervise the 
project because it could be promoted in their election campaigns” (Bangkok Post 13 June 2004). 
Corruption in Thailand and its links with politics has been well documented (Ockey, 1994; Pasuk and 
Sungsidh, 1996; Pasuk and Baker, 1997). Much of the water investments in Isaan during the military 
regimes involved high ranking officers. The example of Sia Leng, a jao pho (godfather) from Khon 
Kaen, given by Pasuk and Sungsidh (1996) illustrates the links between the military regime and 
money politics. "Because of his underworld activities (lottery, logging) and the gang conflicts which 
they involved, Sia Leng needed protection and hence cultivated friendship with military man and high 
officials. He cultivated his relationship with General Chavalit by assisting with his Green Isaan 
project, a scheme designed by a group of officers to "demonstrate military leadership of rural 
development in rivalry to civilian government. Again the scheme provided opportunity for jao pho to 
demonstrate alignment with powerful military figures". Programmes like the ARD were also known to 
be associated with corrupt practices. Contracts for road design and construction supervision were 
cancelled in 1979 "due to alleged irregularities on the part of some ARD staff and consultants. 
Charges of inadequate work performance also led to several court actions against contractors" (World 
Bank, 1985). 
This situation is in no way peculiar to Thailand. In post-war Japan, a system of collusion between 
politicians, businessmen, and bureaucrats evolved. They formed a so-called "iron triangle" of shared 
benefit and influence which made public works projects the center of a system of vested interests that 
encouraged bribery and bid rigging. Massive government spending on public works projects often 
benefited business rather than the general public (Feldhoff; 2002; Woodall; 1993). In the US, too, 
much of the construction drive of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers has 
been fuelled by and linked to a triangle of shared interests (Reisner, 1986; McCool, 1987). Collusion 
between business, politics and bureaucrats in the water sector is a commonality shared by virtually all 
countries (Repetto; 1996). 
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4.3 The development industry: A fixed discourse in a changing world? 
Beyond general justifications of development and the pervasiveness of political interests, analysis of 
the last 50 years shows a remarkable regularity in the promotion of large scale water resources 
development in Northeast Thailand. Although this vision has gradually been challenged and has 
somehow evolved with regard to which projects are pushed forward, it has by and large adhered to the 
ethos of the hydraulic mission, whereby the opportuneness of water infrastructural development is 
seen as obvious and other considerations - whether economic, social, or environmental – are at best 
treated as externalities to be mitigated. 
Although a common feature of the four post-war decades that saw 'modernization' and technology as 
central to economic development, this ethos has also been linked to, and nurtured by, the wider debate 
around water resources development in the Mekong basin (Friesen, 1999; Nguyen, 1999; Jacobs, 
1995; Molle et Floch, 2008). Grand plans, modelled after the TVA, to achieve a "comprehensive 
development" of the basin, including several major dams on the mainstream, ensured the prominence 
of the engineering mindset. The engineers of the US Bureau of Reclamation, in particular, transplanted 
their "culture of irrigation" to Asia, most particularly to Thailand where American influence was 
greater: a dozen Thais visited the Bureau in the US as early as 1946 (Biggs, 2006) and intense 
exchanges lasted at least two decades. The concept of river basin full development promoted by the 
TVA was apparent in the reconnaissance on the Chi-Mun basin carried out by the Bureau in 1965 at 
the request of USAID. It produced a report where almost every single tributary to the Chi and the Mun 
rivers was dammed in its upper course (see Floch et al., 2007). 
The Royal Irrigation Department created a culture where floods and drought automatically translated 
into proposals for more dams and more irrigation schemes. This was predicated, as shown above, on 
the self-defined engineering mission of RID but also on a disregard for indirect costs and on the 
argument that "water flows to the Mekong unused" (Roonruang, in Watershed 1999): a typical 
argument insensitive to wider ecosystemic functions of the water regime as well as to pre-existing 
people's livelihoods, echoed in 1995 by the Foreign Minister of Thailand: "It has been a pity to let the 
Mekong River, with its abundance of water resources, just flow to the sea" (cited in Friesen, 1999). 
Also, while the rhetoric of participation and local and small-scale developments featured prominently 
in basically all water planning documents after the 1978 AIT report, the underlying understanding of 
the uses of water and the discourses surrounding the utilization of basin resources have merely been 
readjusted to comply with the overall policy, with no substantial rethinking of the benefits and costs 
associated with water resources developments at large. A case in point is Rinfret (1988) who analyzed 
ways to “Filling small watersheds with weirs” (the title of his report) – a computer-aided decision-
support tool calculating how many weirs were technically feasible for implementation on any given 
tributary. This highlights that the paradigm of comprehensive and full development (leaving no drop 
of water run waste to the Mekong), has been carried over successfully from the 1960s planning 
practices into the time of participatory water resources development. 
In retrospect, the above review of water resources development plans in Isaan reveals an impressive 
insistence and ingenuity in finding ways to mobilize water for the region. We can at least identify six 
main options that have been explored and/or implemented at different points in times (Figure 4): 1) 
small scale storage or diversion structures (ponds, tanks, weirs,…) have been an early solution that 
resurfaced in the late 70s; 2) damming the various tributaries of the Chi and Mun rivers has been the 
hallmark of the 1965 USBR survey and several of these dams have been constructed; 3) The Pa Mong 
dam long was the cornerstone of irrigation through diversion of the Mekong waters (and gave way to 
several variants in the KCM project, where water would be pumped from the rivers); 4) pumping 
stations along the main rivers were disseminated by the NEA/DEDP, starting in the 70s up to the mid 
90s; 5) storing water in the flood plain itself, through a succession of weirs was first introduced in the 
1980s (NEDECO, 1982) and later incorporated in the KCM project; 6) last, frustrated efforts to import 
water directly from the Mekong led to creative plans to siphon water from dams located in Lao-PDR 
under the Mekong into Isaan. 
This engineering drive and the fixed discourse stressing the "urgent need to bring water from the 
Mekong to alleviate the region's water needs" (Interim Committee, 1988) have been gradually 
challenged on economic, environmental, and social grounds. 
Figure 4: Main options for the mobilization of water resources in Isaan 
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Economic considerations have never featured prominently in Isaan project planning, The 1988 
Revised Indicative Plan of the Mekong Committee reveals that the "economic returns [of the five 
Isaan projects] are not very attractive. This is due to forecasted low rice prices… Nevertheless, the 
economics of the projects may improve considerably if a greater proportion of upland crops is 
introduced… A major consideration with respect to irrigation projects in Northeastern Thailand is that 
economic merits of a project do not capture other critical strategic and political aspects such as 
employment generation and risk reduction…under the 'Green E-sarn Scheme' and for socio-political 
reasons, irrigation in Northeastern Thailand is likely to be acceptable at somewhat lower economic 
returns than elsewhere in the country" (Interim Committee, 1988). The cost-effectiveness of small-
scale projects has also been at best dubious, with "a consensus among government engineers building 
small reservoirs and other small projects that such projects cannot be justified in economic terms, but 
are necessary for political reasons or for their social benefits" (AIT, 1979). Some academics have also 
disputed the economic relevance of the later KCM and Water Grid projects but these arguments have 
had relatively little effect. 
Environmental issues have been somehow more prominent. The salinization problems, the conflicts on 
flood plain management around the Rasi Salai and Huana dams, on the Mun River, have generated 
debates about Environmental Impact Assessment and critiques about the ways shoddy assessments are 
used to "greenwash" projects. For example, the first EIA done for the Songkhram Irrigation Project in 
1992 by consultants AEC et al. were rejected by the National Environment Board (NEB), after finding 
that these were exact copies of EIAs that had been done earlier for another large-scale water diversion 
project, the Khong-Chi- Mun (Breukers, 1999). In 1991, Dr. Mark Rentschler of the US Treasury 
Department advised the US Government that “The environmental impact assessment prepared for the 
Pak Mun project did not "appear adequate to allow the [World Bank’s] Board of Directors to evaluate 
the environmental soundness of the project” (Watershed 1(3)). Nevertheless, the World Bank and 
EGAT never commissioned a new EIA and continued to state that the Pak Mun dam would only have 
minimal impact on the surrounding natural and human environments (Friesen, 1999). Likewise, in 
2002, in the mid of conflicts related to the Rasi Salai and Pak Mun dams, the DEDP submitted a 
proposal and an EIA for the second phase of the KCM project but the expert panel which analyzed the 
EIA rejected the proposal on the ground that the comprehensive groundwater study carried out by 
KKU had not yet been completed (Wiszniewski, 2003). 
The Minister of Natural Resources and Environment, Praphat Panyachartrak, attempted to upgrade 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedures in order "to catch up with the rapid economic 
growth" and to promote participation from the public, who –according to him- should "be allowed a 
much bigger say in state development projects, which will also face tougher scrutiny from a new 
agency" (Bangkok Post, February 2004). His efforts were not rewarded and perhaps not unrelated to 
his removal and replacement by Suvit Khunkitti, the main proponent of the Water Grid. In sum, EIAs 
are seen as a "bureaucratic “hoop” to be jumped through in order to start construction, not as an 
authentic mechanism to decide whether or not the dam should be built" (Friesen, 1999). This has led 
local groups to engage in grassroots research in order to mobilize local knowledge and to produce 
"people's EIA" (Manorom, 2007). 
The conflicts around the Pak Mun and Rasi Salai dams, let alone earlier occurrences of displacement 
because of dam construction, have shown abundantly that social impacts have been equally neglected, 
belittled in the name of national development. Unfortunately the debate between the state and NGOs is 
now polarized. The government distinguishes between "good" and "bad" NGOs and generally either 
attempts to keep planning secretive21 or envisions debates in terms of confrontation, as suggested by 
Prime Minister Samak's recent declaration that "he did not care about opposition from non-
governmental organisations" (Charoenpo, 2008). The narrowness of this vision and the continuing 
disregard for site-specific conditions was demonstrated by his declaration that "the project was 
realistic, given what Israel had done by turning its arid areas into fertile farmland," and his vow "to 
                                                     
21 An article in the Bangkok Post (2004) referred to military units conducting ‘psychological operations' in order to convince 
local people to accept the construction of the Kaeng Sua Teng dam. 
make it possible even though he could possibly face criticism from environmentalists" (Charoenpo, 
2008). 
The fixity of the development discourse is also demonstrated by the obsessive focus on water resource 
and irrigation development (see above) and a disregard for alternatives, although reservations surfaced 
–at times- in official reports. For example, a World Bank report in 1969 noted that "the North East is 
merely the more striking example of the widespread predisposition to disregard the potential for rain-
fed agriculture – at least at the official level". An 1977 ECAFE report considered that the Chi Mun 
was inadequate for irrigation because of lack of storage sites and because of their "flashy flow"; 
groundwater was also contemplated but found salty or sulphurous so that with the exception of small 
tanks for which the number of sites was also deemed "limited". Even if irrigation development was, 
arguably, a sound public investment option in the 1970s, the lack of re-evaluation is striking: at a time 
when neighbouring countries like Malaysia are resolutely moving out of an agrarian economy to 
higher value economic activities, billion dollars worth of investments plans in irrigation infrastructure 
still make the headlines in Thailand, despite the fact that agricultural labour is already in short supply, 
rice markets are saturated, and many remaining soils are salinity-prone (in Isaan) (Molle and Floch, 
2007). 
5 Conclusion 
Colby (1984) attempts to distinguish between successive conceptualisations of the relationship 
between development and the environment. Frontier economics paradigm has long been dominant, 
with its exclusive priority given to conventional economic growth and a vision of the environment as a 
mere physical support. The 'environmental protection paradigm' stresses that some economic growth 
must be foregone in order to preserve the environment, while the 'resource management paradigm' 
argues that only by maintaining a healthy environment can we ensure growth. International institutions 
like the World Bank or the ADB are supposed to have gone through the three phases and to now rest 
with a resource management paradigm which should be reflected in their practices and, perhaps, might 
have somehow percolated down to borrowing countries (Colby, 1984). 
In the case of Isaan, or Thailand in general, evidence of such a shift is suggested by several facts: the 
greening of legislation, the advent of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, the 
requirement of EIA (under certain conditions), the strengthening and maturing of environmental 
and/or livelihood-oriented NGOs of different stripes, the organization of civil society around struggles 
on the Huana or the Pak Mun dams, etc. can be taken as clear signs of change. 
At the same time it is debatable whether the mindsets of engineers, bureaucratic thinking, politicians' 
view of water resources, or the core business of consultant companies have really evolved in parallel. 
The above account suggests that most of the worldviews and interests that underpinned the ideologies 
of the hydraulic mission or the 'frontier economics' are alive and well. Avoidance, distortion, or 
manipulation of EIAs, attempts to denigrate social movements, continued use of overriding objectives 
(food security, national security, poverty alleviation, etc) to close debate, token participation of 
stakeholders to build legitimacy, and other political devices show that practice has only been 
superficially modified. According to Chomchai (2001) "national environmental policy seems to have 
been overshadowed and indeed supplanted by a development strategy that favors the industrial and 
commercial sectors and vested interests at the expense of natural ecological balance and overall 
national interest". Whether it is demanded by population growth, extrapolated energy needs, or 
promises of bright economic future for the region, large water infrastructures are still presented as 
something of a panacea. 
Although the grand projects of the Cold War era may have reflected both the ideology of full-river 
basin development and the geopolitical interest of the US, the logic and bundle of political and 
financial interests underpinning large-scale water projects have not significantly subsided since that 
time. In developing countries classical 'iron triangles' give way to influential and lasting 'iron 
rectangles': Politicians derive direct political benefit from building strong constituencies through their 
mediation of public investments (O'Mara, 1990); state bureaucracies ensure sustained budgets and  
strengthen their professional legitimacy; private consulting and construction firms ensure a steady 
flow of business opportunities. In addition, projects typically offer scope for corrupt practices that 
enhance the private financial benefits of one or several of these actors. The forth apex of the rectangle 
is formed by development banks and cooperation agencies, which also have vested interests in 
maximizing disbursement of funds (Molle, 2008). Relationships between these four apexes are very 
fluid and vary with time but the confluence and coincidence of their interests is extremely strong. All, 
by and large, benefit from continued large scale development of infrastructures. 
This does not mean that these four groups of organizations are homogeneous. Other segments of the 
administration (typically the Ministry of finances or the NESDB) may disagree and successfully 
oppose projects; development banks may also strengthen their social and environmental criteria and 
not support particular projects. Yet, the declaration of Prime Minister Samak – less than a week after 
being appointed – about a megaproject to bring water to Isaan provides a fascinating and remarkable 
continuity to 60 years of water policy centered on the "desert bloom" promise. Whose dreams and 
visions are being fulfilled by the river development schemes? ask Hudson-Rodd and Shaw (2003),  
"who benefits from the projects and who determines what projects are carried out in the name of 
“progress and development”?" 
The emerging major (unanswered) question is why, after all, governance shifts are so hard to come 
about. Why would it be not possible to do "good projects", with adequate safeguards, compensations, 
detailed assessments of future impacts and strict screening of projects? For Grey and Sadoff (2006), 
who acknowledge the need for improved project governance, "the world is a different place in the 21st 
Century, and there is no doubt that the costly mistakes of the past can and must be avoided in the 
future." Investments in hardware should be paralleled by "investment in institutions", with capacity 
building, participation and good-will supposed to make a difference. The above account of decision-
making in water resource development in Isaan suggests that this view includes a good dose of wishful 
thinking and that institutions are not easily swayed by injection of money or rhetorical calls for a 
"responsible growth". Governance shifts are slow and result from the complex interplay of local, 
national and global dynamics, with democratization more likely to result from hard-fought battles than 
from the mere desirability of social and environmental sustainability. 
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